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Introduction 
Our image of the global system shapes our assessment of the possibilities for 
meaningful action in fundamental ways. For much of the post-war period, the 
dominant image has been of a world divided into separate, formally equal, sovereign 
nation-states.1 This image of the global system envisages politics as occurring within 
states because it is only there where the full range of social relations exists between 
individuals constituted as a demos. By contrast, international politics taken literally is 
an oxymoron, since the absence of a global demos means that individuals can only 
relate to each other in power terms, as bearers of their state’s sovereignty and 
‘national interest’.  
 
The lesson this image teaches is that those wanting to make a difference should enter 
government—either as politicians, bureaucrats, or technical advisors. Influence can 
only be exerted if one is part of the state apparatus. Those who envisage the world this 
way view market and civil society actors as epiphenomenon. Social and 
environmental activists in particular are regarded as, at best, well-meaning idealists. 
They are treated as naïve individuals who do not understand what power is, where it 
resides, or how to enlist it to secure desired objectives.  
 
This statist image of the global system continues to be promoted in first-year IR 
courses, influencing a new generation of IR students to imagine the world as a realm 
of unsocialised unitary actors engaged in a Hobbesian struggle for power in a system 
characterised by anarchy, sovereignty and self-help.2 These lessons are taught despite 
the fact that we now know a great deal more about the state than we did at the 
commencement of the post-war period3 and despite the fact that the process of 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Henry Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1960); and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley 1979).  
2 Matters are somewhat different when introductory IR courses are taught by those influenced by 
Hedley Bull and the English School of IR theory. While the statist image dominates their 
understanding of the global system, they do not view states as completely unsocialised entities. Rather, 
the interstate system is minimally institutionalised via the conventions of sovereignty, diplomacy and 
the practice of pacta sunt servanda. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical  Society: A Study of Order in 
World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press 1977).   
3 For neo-Gramscian analyses of the state in the global system, see Robert Cox, Power, Production and 
World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) 
and Steven Gill and Denis Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems, Policies 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1988). For a more mainstream strategic account, see 
globalization is deepening daily giving rise to direct, unmediated, individual market, 
social and cultural transactions across the globe facilitated by the new information and 
communications technologies. In forming friendships on Facebook and MySpace, 
playing virtual chess and scrabble, engaging in internet gambling, buying goods and 
services off E-Bay, engaging in internet dating, signing global petitions, and 
participating in the electoral politics of distant spaces, individuals are constructing 
new, more cosmopolitan identities.4 Neither our new knowledge about the state nor 
the new identities being formed in cyber-space are shaking mainstream IR’s 
unshakeable faith in its image of the inter-state system. 
 
It is evident that political significance of this globalising sphere of unmediated social, 
political, economic and cultural transactions has yet to be fully grasped. However, the 
shrinking of space and time and the creation of increasingly dense interpersonal 
global networks is opening up the possibility for the first time of large scale, 
simultaneous deliberation within virtual communities on a host of topics. It permits in 
a very real sense the formation of vertical sectoral ‘polities’ that complement 
conventional, horizontal, space-based polities and are beginning to compete with 
states for rule making authority in designated issue areas.5  
 
This is a potentially radical and empowering opportunity. 
 
It is one that an emerging global citizenry need to seize if it is to resolve the pressing 
challenges it is confronting as a consequence of the globalization process itself. The 
new image of the global system made possible as a consequence of the process of 
globalisation is of a more integrated and democratic world—one where spatially 
based ‘horizontal polities’ (states) share power in designated issue areas with sectoral 
polities ‘vertical polities’ (stewardship councils) founded and managed by global civil 
                                                                                                                                            
Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International 
Organization 42, 3 (1988): 427-260. 
4 David Held as been at the forefront of the analysis of cosmopolitanism. See David Held, Democracy 
and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press 1995).  
5 See, for example, B. Cashore, G. Auld, and D. Newsom. Governing through Markets: Forest 
Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2004); 
and Volker Rittberger and Martin Nettesheim (eds), Authority in the Global Political Economy (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan 2008).  
  
society. The radical promise of this approach—which is redolent of Mitrany’s 
functionalism but does not depend on the ‘political will’ of states for its 
implementation6—is the promise of re-imbedding global production and consumption 
relations within their environmental, social and developmental limits.  
 
In this paper, I outline an alternative image of the global system that highlights the 
formation of such vertical, ‘sectoral polities’ to complement existing horizontal 
territorial polities and compete with them for rule-making authority in designated 
issue areas may be possible. I do this by describing the most well-developed and 
impressive sectoral polity, the one presided over by the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC). I argue that we should conceive the FSC as far more than an international 
organisation, a ‘market based instrument’ (MBI) for sustainable forest management,7 
a ‘non-state, market-based’ system (NSMB),8 or even a ‘transnational, rule-oriented 
system (TROS).9 I argue that the FSC is simultaneously constituting and being 
constituted by a nascent global, ecologically sustainable forestry polity composed of 
individuals operating within environmental, social and business networks who, 
despite their differences, are elaborating a common vision of how to envisage, 
implement and regulate ‘environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and 
economically viable’ forestry. In particular, I highlight the unique governance 
arrangements within this emerging sectoral polity, which I term Global Democratic 
Corporatism.10 It is FSC’s unique governance arrangements that have enabled it to 
constitute a global, ecologically sustainable forestry polity distinguishing it in form 
and function from all other arrangements that share may of its objectives but few of 
its institutional features.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, I outline an argument that 
explains the rise of new, global institutions such as the FSC as a consequence of four 
                                                 
6 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1943); see 
also, David Mitrany, A Functional Theory of Politics, edited by M. Robertson (London: LSE 1975).  
7 For further information on MBIs, see Chris Tollefson, The Wealth of Forests: Markets, Regulation 
and Sustainable Forestry (Vancouver: UBC Press 1998).  
8 Cashore et al, Governing Through Markets. 
9 Errol Meidinger, “The administrative law of global private-public regulation: The case 
of forestry”, European Journal of International Law 17 (2006): 47-87. 
10 A fully elaborated account can be found in Chris Tollefson, Fred Gale and David Haley, Setting the 
Standard: Governance, Certification and the Forest Stewardship Council (Vancouver: UBC Press 
2008).  
interacting phenomena: globalisation, governance, global civil society and 
functionalism. Following this theoretical overview, I show how these four elements 
combined to generate pressure for the formation of the Forest Stewardship Council in 
the early 1990s. To do this, I describe the lacklustre performance of inter-
governmental forestry organisations through the 1980s, the failure to negotiate a 
global forest convention at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), and the symbolic politics of the post-UNCED forestry 
institutions. Next, I outline how these intergovernmental failures of the 1980s and 
1990s motivated a growing group of timber importers, environmentalists, forestry 
professionals and social activists to search for an alternative institution and describe 
the FSC’s establishment, structure and development. In the conclusion, I examine the 
hostile response of states and the mainstream forest products industry to the FSC, 
offer several explanations as to the origins of this hostility, and speculate on whether 
the FSC is capable of becoming fully embedded in the global system as the ecological 
sustainable forestry polity of choice. 
 
Global Civil Society and Institution Formation 
Why are global civil society institutions being established now? I submit that it is the 
consequence of four interacting phenomena: globalization, governance, global civil 
society and functional agency. Globalization constitutes the context in which the other 
phenomena operate. While the literature on globalization is vast—and there are 
significant disputes between ‘hyper-globalizers’, ‘global sceptics’ and ‘global 
transformationalists’,11 at bottom the term captures the idea that the world is shrinking 
in space and time and that distant events are of far greater significance to local 
communities. In the words of Held et al, globalization involves 
 
a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of the 
extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or 
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of 
power.12 
 
                                                 
11 The terminology comes from David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, 
Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press 1999).  
12 Held et al, Global Transformations, 16. 
A key feature of globalisation is that it is ‘decentering’ the state as the prime mover in 
national and global politics. This of course is not to say that the state is becoming 
insignificant or unimportant. However, the state is now required to share power with 
market and civil society actors in a process that has come to be called ‘governance’. 
Like ‘globalization’, the concept of governance is much debated in the literature.13 
Interestingly, while much of the literature on governance maintains a key role for the 
state, an increasing number of authors have identified possibilities for non-state 
governance in the existence of public-private partnerships, private regimes and non-
state, market-based governance systems.14 Nationally, governance has been 
popularised via the formation of ‘public-private partnerships’ often between business 
and governments. The former are keen to profit from neo-liberalisms downsizing and 
privatizing of state functions, while the latter are interested in relieving themselves of 
the costs of ‘rowing’ so they can focus on ‘steering’.15 Private international regimes, 
such as those presided over in the global financial system by bond agencies, regulate 
participants in the system by subjecting them to a rating system that can offer rewards 
and inflict punishments through the market. Likewise, NSMB governance systems 
attempt to enlist the potential market rewards of doing the right thing via certification 
and labelling.   
 
In unleashing governance arrangements within and beyond the state, globalization has 
fostered the growth of national and, increasingly, global civil society organisations.16 
At the state level, the need to cooperate with an increasingly large number of actors as 
state’s remove themselves from delivering a huge range of services has necessitated 
devolving responsibility to private social service agencies, educational institutions, 
environmental organisations and indigenous communities. As civil society has 
                                                 
13 For a useful overview of its diverse connotations in different disciplines, see Anne Kjaer, 
Governance (Key Concepts). Cambridge: Polity Press 2004.  
14 On private regimes, see A. Claire Cutler, Tony Porter and Virginia Haufler, Private Authority and 
International Affairs (Albany, NY: SUNY Press). On NSMBs, see Cashore et al, Governing Through 
Markets.  
15 This terminology is borrowed from Gunningham et al, who popularised the concept of ‘smart 
regulation’ in which public-private partnerships played a key role. See Neil Gunningham, Peter 
Grabowsky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1999).  
16 For an early account of global civil society, see Martin Shaw, “Global civil society and global 
responsibility: The theoretical, historical and political limits of “international relations”, Millennium 23 
(1992): 421-34. Recent accounts have focused on the role of transnational advocacy networks in the 
human rights, environmental and violence against women issue areas. See Margaret Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press 1998).  
developed within states, so have actors increasingly linked up globally to advocate for 
policies at the global level. Increasingly, global civil society actors are contesting the 
right of state and market leaders to decide on their own the shape of policy. While 
often viewed as filling the function of global ‘pressure groups’, civil society 
organisations are now establishing their own global institutions that by-pass states in 
the search for regulatory solutions to the increasingly pressing environmental, social 
and cultural problems consequent on the operation of globalising capitalism.  
 
Much of the IR literature on institution formation in the interstate system presumes 
that this is the responsibility of nation states. In Mitrany’s original formulation, 
international organisations were formed by states by devolving responsibility to 
functional agencies in a variety of technical areas.17 Citizens, he argued, would come 
to value these global institutions for the work they performed and would gradually 
transfer their allegiance to them, enabling states to dispense with their own national 
operations. Later, via neo-functionalism, Ernst Haas applied the logic of 
functionalism to understanding the development of the European Union.18 In Haas’ 
conception of neo-functionalism, a special role existed for agents within the European 
Commission, who could push the process of integration forward utilising the logic of 
‘spill-over’ in both its technical and political senses. Later, a ‘functional’ theory of 
international regimes was put forward by Robert Keohane that privileges state actors 
as those who identify the need for international institutions in a system characterised 
by increasing interdependence where states are sensitive and possible vulnerable to 
the actions of distant others.19  
 
                                                 
17 Although mostly concerned with states, Mitrany does note the possibility of the functional approach 
being applied to non-state actors. Hence he observes: “It is not only in the field of government and 
economics that the functional approach brings relief. In a noteworthy sermon which the Archbishop of 
Canterbury preached before the University of Cambridge in 1946, he boldly admitted that all schemes 
of unification between the English churches had failed because, as he insisted, they had tried a 
constitutional reunion, and he called for a different approach simply by the exchange of ministers and 
pulpits.” David Mitrany, “The functional approach to world organisation”, International Affairs 24, 3 
(1948): 357. 
18 Ernst Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1975).  
19 In Keohane’s own words, “Two features of the international context are particularly important: world 
politics lacks authoritative governmental institutions, and is characterized by pervasive uncertainty. 
Within this setting, a major function of international regimes is to facilitate the making of mutually 
beneficial agreements among governments, so that the structural condition of anarchy does not lead to a 
complete “war of all against all”. See Robert Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes”, 
International Organization 36, 2 (Spring 1982): 332. 
But globalisation is not merely encouraging actors within states to consider their 
options and search for alternative arrangements. As a complex political, economic, 
technological and cultural process, globalisation is simultaneously shrinking space 
and time enabling previously distant and fragmented individuals to establish ongoing 
relationships and to establish virtual communities.20 While face-to-face meetings have 
by no means been dispensed with, the gaps between meetings no longer constitute 
‘down time’ and can be productively utilised to expand and deepen relationships and 
strengthen institutions. Because the technologies of globalisation are widely available, 
including in the capital cities of developing countries, the possibility exists for the 
first time of forming truly global institutions to tackle pressing environmental, social 
and developmental problems. Thus, although functionalism provides a partial 
explanation of how institutions come into being, we can jettison the prevailing 
assumption that the actors engaged in their formation represent state or regional 
bodies.  
 
In the environmental arena, the rise of global civil society activism can be traced to 
the late 1960s when individuals concerned about the demise of whales, elephants, 
tigers and panda—in short ‘charismatic megafauna’—began to attend international 
forums as observers in ever larger numbers. While not permitted to do more than 
make the occasional speech in plenary meetings at UN meetings, individuals 
participating at these meetings lobbied national delegations, published daily 
newsletters on progress, and coordinated their actions to achieve more effective 
outcomes. As environmental issues began to dominate the international agenda in the 
1980s—notably with respect to the threat to the ozone layer—civil society actors 
redoubled their efforts to influence international organisations to adopt tough policies. 
They were extensively involved in several high-profile and largely successful 
negotiations during the decade. These included the securing of a moratorium on 
whaling at the International Whaling Commission from 1986 onwards,21 banning 
chlorofluorocarbons that damaged the ozone layer at the Vienna Convention (1985) 
                                                 
20 For a range of views of the political, economic and cultural effects of globalization on national 
polities, see Yale H. Ferguson; Richard W. Mansbach; Robert A. Denemark; Hendrik Spruyt; Barry 
Buzan; Richard Little; Janice Gross Stein; Michael Mann, “What Is the Polity? A Roundtable”, 
International Studies Review 2, 1 (Spring, 2000): 3-31. 
21 See M.J. Peterson, “Whalers, cetologists, environmentalists and the international management of 
whaling”, International Organization 46, 1 (1992): 147-186 for a detailed account of the global 
whaling regime.  
and the Montreal Protocol (1987),22 and promoting the regulation of the trade in toxic 
waste that led to the negotiation of the Basle Convention (1992).23  
 
A key sector that occupied a great deal of the time of global civil society actors during 
this decade was tropical forestry. FAO had released the results of its first tropical 
forest assessment in 198224 and it had revealed very high levels of tropical 
deforestation around the world, notably in the Southeast Asia countries of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. In response, environmentalists encouraged states 
to redouble their efforts to establish the International Tropical Timber Organisation 
(ITTO) (see below) and in developing the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP). 
Towards the end of the decade, they were also extensively if informally involved in 
negotiations on a global forestry convention in the lead up to the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. In contrast to their 
successes with whales, ozone and toxic waste, however, tropical forestry resisted the 
negotiation of substantive agreement of any kind. Moreover, it appeared that forestry 
might be more the rule than the exception when it came to negotiating international 
environmental agreements, as concerns loomed over climate change, fisheries 
depletion, unsustainable agriculture and water. There is little doubt that growing 
frustration with the lack of progress in the tropical forestry sector prompted a deep 
search for functional alternatives to existing institutions that might produce 
substantive binding commitments that would then be implemented on the ground. 
 
To better understand why global civil society actors became increasingly frustrated 
with intergovernmentalism and why they were prompted to form their own global 
civil society institution, I turn now to a review of the history of intergovernmental 
negotiations in the forestry sector.  
 
 
 
                                                 
22 For accounts of negotiations to establish the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, see 
Richard Benedict, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Boston: Harvard 
University Press 1994); Karen Litfin, Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental 
Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press 1994).  
23 See Jennifer Clapp, “Africa, NGOs, and the International Toxic Waste Trade”, The Journal of 
Environment & Development 3, 2 (1994): 17-46. 
24 FAO, Tropical Forest Resources. Rome: FAO, 1982. 
Intergovernmental Failure and the Search for Alternatives 
Of all the sectors under international negotiation in the 1980s, none has proved so 
resistant to reaching agreement as the forestry sector. There are numerous reasons for 
this. Firstly, forests embrace a huge range of mutually exclusive values. Historically, 
the economic value of forests has dominated, with governments and industry focused 
on the volume of timber that can be extracted from a primary natural forest during the 
initial harvest of old growth and later, after the ‘fall down’, from the sustained yield.25 
This ‘liquidation and conversion’ developmentalist approach to forests proved 
relatively unproblematic until the 1970s,26 when increasingly ecologists began to 
point out that forests were more than trees—they were rich ecosystems where 
complex food webs and chains interacted in the production and maintenance of 
biodiversity.27 As awareness grew of the ecological richness of forests, concern 
increased about ‘conventional’ approaches to forest management as well as the large-
scale conversion projects that many states and businesses engaged in designed to 
replace forested land with plantation monocultures of one crop or another.  
 
Early concern focused on tropical forests where, coincidentally, efforts were already 
underway through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) to promote an international commodity agreement on tropical forests as 
part of its Integrated Program for Commodities (IPC).28 This prompted 
environmentalists to push for the successful conclusion of these negotiations and the 
inclusion of a ‘conservationist’ objective within the agreement. Thus, brokered in 
1983 and ratified at the insistence of environmental civil society organisations in 1985, 
the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) came into being.29 ITTO itself 
                                                 
25 For a detailed discussion of the ‘fall down’ effect, see M. Patricia Marchak, S. Aycock and D. Hebert,  
Falldown: Forest policy in British Columbia (Vancouver: Ecotrust Canada 1999); for a discussion of 
the concept of sustained yield forest management see Lois Dellert, “Sustained yield: Why has it failed 
to achieve sustainability?”, in The wealth of Forests: Markets, Regulation, and Sustainable Forestry 
(Vancouver: UBC Press 1998): 255-77 
26 The terminology comes from Jeremy Wilson, Talk and Log: Wilderness politics in British Columbia, 
1965-96 (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press 1998). 
27 Herb Hammond, Seeing the forest among the trees: The case for holistic forest use (Vancouver: 
Polestar 1991); Chris Maser, The Redesigned Forest (San Pedro, CA: R. and E. Miles 1988).  
28 For an insiders account of the IPC, see Gamani Corea, Taming Commodity Markets: The Integrated 
Programme and the Common Fund in UNCTAD (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1992).  
29 For detailed accounts of the ITTO see David Humphreys, Forest Politics: The Evolution of 
Cooperation (London: Earthscan 1996); Fred Gale, The Tropical Timber Trade Regime (Basingstoke 
UK: Palgrave Macmillan 1998); and Marie-Claude Smouts, Tropical Forests, International Jungle: 
The Underside of Global Ecopolitics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003). For an insiders views, see 
was an a-typical international institution due to the absence of a buffer stock and the 
presence of a conservation objective. Structurally, it was composed of two 
governmental coalitions: tropical timber producing countries, which were almost 
exclusively from developing countries; and tropical timber consuming countries, 
which were almost exclusively from developed countries. The ITTO met twice a year 
with one session held at its headquarters in Yokohama, Japan and the other overseas 
in a developing country. since 1985. While it remains in operation today, it was 
engaged by ECSOs most vigorously in the years between 1987 and 1992. For much of 
the 1980s, it was the forum for intergovernmental negotiations on tropical forests, 
despite the much longer establishment of its major rival, the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations.  
 
Global civil society actors were instrumental in pushing states to ratify the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement to give birth to the ITTO in 1985 and they 
were welcomed to early meetings with open arms. A large number of ECSOs were 
given observer status and the twice-annual meetings of ITTO appeared full of activity 
and promise. Representatives of WWF, Friends of the Earth, International Institute for 
Environment and Development, National Wildlife Federation, Rainforest Information 
Centre, Rainforest Action Networks, Survival International, the World Conservation 
Union (IUCN), and many other environmental civil society organisations (ECSO) 
regularly attended these meetings.30 Early on, Duncan Poore, a forester with extensive 
experience in the tropics and consulting with the London-based International Institute 
for Environment and Development (IIED), was hired by ITTO to carry out a review 
of sustainable forest management in tropical timber countries. Poore reported that less 
than 1 percent was being managed sustainably.31 Chris Elliott of WWF-International 
participated in the development of a set of guidelines for the sustainable management 
of natural tropical forests that included language around their environmental and 
social values;32 and Poore again participated in a ITTO Mission to Sarawak under the 
                                                                                                                                            
Duncan Poore, Changing Landscapes: The Development of the International Tropical Timber 
Organization and Its Influence on Tropical Forest Management (London: Earthscan 2003).  
30 For details of attendance, see Gale, The Tropical Timber Trade Regime, Table 8.2, 132-133. 
31 Duncan Poore, ‘Natural forest management for sustainable timber production’, Pre-Project Report 
11/88 prepared for the International Tropical Timber Organization by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (London: IIED 1988).  
32 ITTO, ITTO Guidelines for the Sustainable Management of Natural Tropical Forests, ITTO Policy 
Development Series 1 (Yokohama, Japan: 1992), 
http://www.itto.or.jp/live/PageDisplayHandler?pageId=201  
leadership of Lord Gasthorne Cranbrook, which promised to resolve problems of 
over-harvesting there while simultaneously addressing the concerns of the native 
Penan indigenous community.  
 
Yet, the ITTO proved much better at identifying problems than at negotiating 
solutions to them. Despite having reported that only a tiny percentage of tropical 
forests was sustainably managed, little by way of concrete action could be agreed 
between the official parties on what to do about it. Even with regard to the guidelines 
for the sustainable management of tropical forests, states had reserved their right to 
determine whether, when and how to implement them. The final straw for 
environmentalists came when the Cranbrook’s Mission to Sarawak issued its final 
report, which ECSOs viewed with dismay. Not only did they consider that it set the 
annual harvest far higher than could be ecologically justified, but also although it 
discussed the indigenous peoples issue it was unable to make substantive 
recommendations with respect to them. The NGO Statement to the plenary meeting 
where the Report had been presented stated:  
 
This must be a day of shame for the ITTO. It is the culmination of a week of 
vacillation, compromise and lack of determination to tackle issues central to 
the organization’s mandate… The resolution before the Council is 
unacceptable. It is limited to the weak responses proposed by the Sarawak and 
Malaysian governments. It fails to mention several key issues raised in the 
body of the report.33 
 
 In short, by 1990, ECSOs were thoroughly disillusioned with the ITTO. Nor had 
matters progressed better elsewhere—in the Tropical Forestry Action Plan/Program 
(TFAP) or in the Preparatory Committees to UNCED to negotiate a global forest 
convention.  
 
In 1985, with negotiations at ITTO stalled over the location of its headquarters and 
the appointment of its executive director, a US ECSO, the World Resources Institute, 
joined with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank 
to implement the Tropical Forestry Action Plan. In 1987, and joined by FAO as lead 
implementation agency, TFAP aimed to tackle five priority areas: agroforestry and 
                                                 
33 NGO Statement to the Final Plenary, Ninth Meeting of the International Tropical Timber Industry 
Council, Yokohama, 1989.  
watershed management, protection of species, sustainable management, improved 
logging methods and research and education.34 These objectives were to be achieved 
by providing substantial donor funding to developing tropical countries to prepare 
detailed plans on their forest management activities into the future. While WRI 
anticipated that plans would include setting aside substantial areas for conservation, 
investigating indigenous peoples’ rights, reduced conversion of forest to agriculture 
and improved logging practices, in fact FAO accepted plans that endorsed business-
as-usual forestry and that had the effect of speeding up the process of deforestation 
and forest degradation in the interests of national development. Following three 
negative reviews in 1990 on the program, WRI terminated its involvement and donor 
agencies backed off from funding commitments. Efforts were made, belatedly, to 
reformulate the program to meet critics’ objections, but by then the damage had been 
done and the TFAP never recovered its status or regained ECSO support. 
 
The final straw for global civil society actors with respect to international forestry 
negotiations were the failed efforts to negotiate a global forest convention in the run 
up to UNCED at Rio de Janeiro in 1992.35 Four intergovernmental preparatory 
committee meetings (PrepComs) were held between 1990 and 1992 to draw up the 
text of a convention but early on it became clear that little of substance could be 
agreed. Those promoting the convention (notably the United States and the United 
Kingdom) encountered considerable hostility from other states (notably Brazil and 
Malaysia). The US was being pushed by its own ECSOs to negotiate a convention 
that would provide some level of guarantee that tropical forests would be protected—
particularly the great expanse of Brazil’s Amazonian basin. Forested countries, on the 
other hand, sought an agreement that would embed the sovereign right of states to 
manage their own forests, secure ‘development’ as the overriding principle for use, 
and obtain new and additional funding from developed countries for any actions taken. 
Ultimately all that could be agreed was a weak, non-binding voluntary agreement on  
a set of ‘forest principles’ which deeply disappointed ECSOs but met the 
requirements of heavily forested countries by preserving their sovereign right to 
development their forested estate as they saw fit.  
                                                 
34 Smouts, Tropical Forests, International Jungle, 32. 
35 For a detailed history of UNCED and the post-UNCED forestry institutions, see David Humphreys, 
Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance (London: Earthscan 2006).  
It was this failure of intergovernmentalism to achieve meaningful agreements in the 
1980s and early 1990s then that led ECSOs to search for and debate the merits of 
alternative approaches. Throughout the 1980s, various alternative approaches had 
been canvassed at the ITTO including boycotts, taxes, levies and certification and 
labelling. Boycotts were rejected by most actors as undesirable as they had the effect 
of devaluing timber products and the forest land on which they were grown, 
potentially giving rise to the perverse effect of forest conversion to other crops.36 
Import taxes were potentially discriminatory and, depending on how they were 
implemented, could be challenged under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Moreover, importing governments under the sway of neoliberalism were 
very reluctant to impose new taxes on industry—indeed, the focus was rather the 
opposite, on liberalisation and deregulation. Industry were not keen to implement a 
levy, which they felt was unnecessary on the one hand and administratively 
burdensome on the other. Nor were they at all keen on the idea of certification and 
labelling which, they pointed out, would require a complex system of tracking timber 
from the forest to the consumer, if purchasers were to be assured that they were in fact 
buying certified products. Yet, in one sense, industry—and the state governments that 
backed their position—protested too much. As ECSOs explored the issue of 
certification and labelling, they increasingly discovered a model that might in fact 
work. Armed with this notion—which was being partially implemented in practice by 
the early 1990s—ECSOs began a daring experiment: the establishment of a global 
forest certification organization, the Forest Stewardship Council.  
 
Global Civil Society and the Establishment of the Forest Stewardship Council 
FSC can justifiably claim to be the first genuinely global institution established by 
civil society actors. Its origins lie in several independent initiatives that merged in the 
early 1990s into a vision of an organisation that would certify sustainable forest 
management to a high standard and reward those operations that became certified 
with a certificate through which they could earn a price premium, expand market 
                                                 
36 See, for example, the IUCN’s World Conservation Strategy which notes that: “Blanket boycotts of 
tropical timber are likely to favour forest clearance for low-grade shifting cultivation, because they 
remove economic incentives to keep even modified forests”. IUCN, Caring for the Earth: A Strategy 
for Sustainable Living (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN 1991): 133. 
share and demonstrate corporate social responsibility.37 The key milestones in its 
history include the ITTO’s consultancies on ‘incentives’ for sustainable forest 
management, the Ecological Trading Company’s (ITC) efforts to purchase sustainable 
timber products, the Rainforest Alliance and Scientific Certification System’s 
decision to establish forest certification systems, and the Woodworkers Alliance for 
Rainforest Protection’s (WARP) initiative to prevent a race to the bottom among such 
systems. These separate strands came together in the early 1990s in the establishment 
of an FSC Interim Steering Committee to progress the idea of a global certification 
organisation.  
 
One important thread in the establishment of the FSC were discussions that occurred 
at the ITTO in the late 1980s as a consequence of a Friends of the Earth-UK’s (FoE) 
efforts to have certification and labelling schemes considered. FoE-UK interested the 
British government in the idea and a pre-project proposal was drawn up and placed 
before the ITTO in October 1989. The idea was that ITTO would fund a consultancy 
“to devise a mechanism by which individual consignments of timber from sources 
eligible for consideration as ‘sustainably managed’ can be marked/labelled and 
documented in the producing region, enabling buyers in the consumer countries to 
identify and choose such timber”.38 The proposal was greeted with consternation by 
the tropical timber industry and governments of tropically forested countries. Several 
strong statements were made concerning the potential for certification and labelling 
schemes to act as barriers to trade and to unfairly discriminate against tropical timber 
in developed country markets.39 Following the strident criticisms and objections of 
developing countries, the British government ‘reformulated’ the project proposal to 
focus on ‘incentives’ for sustainable forest management. The project was then 
                                                 
37 This section builds on several accounts of FSC’s formation including Chris Elliott, Forest 
Certification: A Policy Perspective (Bogor, Indonesia: Centre for International Forestry Research, 
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38 ITTO, “Labelling systems for the promotion of sustainably produced tropical timber”, Pre-Project 
Proposal PCM, PCF, PCI (V)/1 (Yokohama, Japan: ITTO, November 1989): 1. 
39 The official ITTO record for the meeting reports comments that included that “The ultimate output of 
the pre-project was a veiled attempt to install a system which was only an incentive to encourage the 
current campaign of boycott against the imports of tropical timber products unless they could be proved 
to be labelled as coming from sustainably managed tropical forests”. See ITTO, Draft report on the 
Seventh Session of the ITTC (Yokohama, Japan: ITTO 1989): 54. 
approved, the UK government agreed to fund it, and the Oxford Forest Institute (OFI) 
was commissioned to carry out the consultancy. The OFI consultants shared 
industry’s doubts over certification and labelling’s feasibility, however, and dismissed 
the idea as unworkable in a couple of paragraphs. Instead, they recommended that a 
levy be implemented by importing governments on tropical timber which could then 
be redirected back to improve forest management in the industry.40 
 
The UK government were unimpressed. A levy would be expensive and complicated 
to administer and there was little political will in Thatcher’s Britain for such an 
initiative. Moreover, the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) which had 
commissioned the report was unimpressed with the summary dismissal of certification 
and labelling schemes without any detailed analysis. ODA officials decided to fund a 
further study on incentives for sustainable forest management, and requested the 
London Environmental Economics Centre (LEEC) to carry it out. LEEC reported in 
early 1993 that certification and labelling could make a modest contribution to 
improving forest management.41 However, the LEEC report was a mixed blessing for 
ECSOs because it also argued that a national scheme would be the most efficient 
process for implementing certification schemes. The problem with national schemes, 
however, as ECSOs clearly pointed out, was that they could promote a race to the 
bottom for forest management standards, with weak standards in some states forcing 
competitor states to lower their standards to maintain market share.  
 
At approximately the same time as ITTO was considering certification and labelling, 
Herman Kwisthout, a bagpipe maker in England, was becoming increasingly 
concerned about the sustainability of the timber he was importing from tropical 
countries.42 Kwisthout’s used high quality exotic hardwoods for his bagpipes but as 
an ethical consumer he also wanted to be sure that his purchases did not lead to 
tropical deforestation and biodiversity loss. His first instinct was to set up the 
Ecological Trading Company (ETC) to import ‘sustainable’ timber from developing 
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countries. However, he quickly learned that the claims made by producers could not 
be verified in any straightforward way because there was no common standard, no 
tracking system, and no simple and appropriate labelling system to inform purchasers. 
Following this experience, he proposed the establishment of an International Forest 
Monitoring Agency (IFMA) to colleagues within the instrument making industry.  
 
Kwisthout’s proposal was discussed in 1990 at a meeting in California of the 
Woodworkers Alliance for Responsible Production (WARP). Like Kwisthout, WARP 
was composed of American producers of fine instruments and they too were 
increasingly concerned about the potential damage done by their importation of 
unsustainable tropical timber. Moreover, WARP was aware that two US-based 
companies were beginning already to certify timber products as coming from 
sustainably managed forests. The Rainforest Alliance’s SmartWood program had 
been established in 1989 and in late 1990 was about to announce the certification of 
Perhum Perhutani’s teak forests in Indonesia. Meanwhile Scientific Certification 
Systems based in Oakwood, California, also indicated that it would begin to certifying 
forests in the near future. The fear expressed by WARP members and those tracking 
certification’s development was that in the absence of a single global standard, the 
newly established schemes would vary considerably in terms of standard, tracking 
processes and labelling requirements. Not only would this generate considerable 
confusion in the market—similar to that attending organic certification—but it could 
lead to race to the bottom in standards development defeating the schemes very 
purpose. At a second WARP meeting the following year, agreement was reached to 
establish an interim steering committee to progress Kwisthout’s idea.  
 
Between 1990 and 1992, several meetings of what became the FSC Interim Steering 
Committee were held. Early on, James Sullivan was hired as a consultant to work 
through the issues. It was recognised at the outset that, if the program was to be global, 
the involvement of a diversity of groups all around the world would be required. With 
funding from the Ford and Macarthur Foundations, consultations were held with 
business, environmental, social and indigenous peoples organisations in about a dozen 
countries including Australia, Canada, Brazil, Papua New Guinea, Sweden, UK and 
the US. Strong support was forthcoming, although each expressed concerns and 
sought to ensure that the newly established body would be responsive. By 1991, it had 
been decided to call the nascent organisation the Forest Stewardship Council and, 
following extensive consultations through 1992 and 1993, the contours of the body 
were slowly worked out. Sullivan proposed that the organisation be established as a 
foundation as this would be cheaper and more manageable. He also drew up, in 
conjunction with an interim standards committee, a draft of the principles and criteria 
of sustainable forest management, drawing on the experience of WWF’s Chris Elliott 
who had participated in the earlier ITTO efforts. Finally, an inaugural conference was 
held in Toronto, Canada in November 1993 to birth the organisation. After protracted 
and difficult negotiations that saw several ECSOs abstain from participating due to 
the presence of representative from the forest industry, agreement was reached on 
establishing the FSC and moving forward the idea of civil society certification and 
labelling.  
 
Sullivan’s original proposal to establish FSC as a foundation was overturned at the 
meeting. Three major compromises had to be made to satisfy those present. The first 
was the FSC was established as a global membership organisation, enabling any 
individual or organisation to join providing it shared FSC’s vision of 
‘environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable’ forest 
management as set out in its draft Principles and Criteria. The second compromise 
was that members of the organisation were to be divided into constituency groups 
based on dominant interest. At the outset, membership divided into two chambers—
an economic chamber and a combined environmental and social chamber. Later, the 
environmental and social chamber was split in two and today FSC is composed of 
three chambers representing economic, environmental and social interests, with each 
chamber having an equally weighted proportion of the total vote. The third major 
compromise was acceptance by economic chamber members of a minority say in the 
running of the FSC; only two of the 9 member board seats were available for 
economic interests, with environmental and social interests controlling the other seven. 
This arrangement was also altered after experience and today each chamber is equally 
represented on the board.  
 
FSC’s structure not only aimed to balance sectoral interests by placing them in 
economic, social and environmental constituencies but it also aimed to give equal 
power to interests along the North/South divide. Thus, members not only belong to a 
sectoral chamber but also represent the geographic region they reside in. In effect, 
therefore, there are six FSC sub-chambers. Voting within each sub-chamber is equally 
weighted giving FSC members a formally equal voice in the development of 
standards, the elaboration of policy and in the operation of the organisation.  
 
Another important decision taken by FSC at its founding meeting was to devolve 
responsibility for actually carrying out certification to profit and non-for-profit 
companies like SCS and SmartWood. The logic of the arrangement was that these 
companies were already in the certification ‘business’ and had built up programs to 
certify forest management operations. It was argued that the most efficient role for 
FSC was to accredit these certifying bodies, licensing them to certify operations on 
FSC’s behalf to FSC’s standard. One of FSC’s first tasks, therefore, was to establish a 
set of criteria for accrediting certifying bodies. Today, over a dozen CBs accredited to 
FSC: in addition to SmartWood and the SCS, accredited companies include SGS 
Qualifor, BM Trada and the Soil Association Woodmark. 
 
Global Democratic Corporatism 
It is these unique features of the FSC system that warrant describing its institutional 
structures as a first ever instance of global democratic corporatism. To examine this 
novel institutional form, I will examine each term, building a case that nothing quite 
like the FSC exists elsewhere. Even in FSC’s sister organisation, the Maritime 
Stewardship Council (MSC), departs from the FSC ‘model’ to a significant extent. To 
commence, FSC is self-evidently a global organisation. It was founded as such and 
between 1993 and 2003 it based its headquarters in Oaxaca, Mexico, demonstrating a 
symbolic if not entirely practical commitment to the global south. In  2003 the 
organisation relocated to Bonn, Germany to take advantage of German government 
largesse and to participate more fully in the rapidly expanding EU market for certified 
timber. The globality of FSC is evident in its founding decision to certify all types of 
forests—tropical, temperate and boreal—and all sizes of forest operations, small, 
medium and large. While FSC has had some difficulty implementing this mandate—
small operators have found its system expensive to implement and it has had 
difficulty certifying forests in developing countries where resources, forest 
management expertise, and a range of other barriers exist—there are no barriers in 
principle limiting its application to any forest any where. 
To meet its global mandate, the FSC has established regional and national working 
groups around the world. It is in these working groups that much of the on-the-ground 
work of the FSC occurs, notably in the setting of national and regional standards for 
forest management operations. For example, FSC-Canada was established in 1996 
and has overseen the development of provincial standards in British Columbia, the 
Maritime provinces and the country’s Boreal forests. In the United States, FSC-US 
promoted the development of standards in Pacific Coast, Rocky Mountains, Northeast, 
and Appalachia regions. Today, there are over 40 accredited FSC national initiatives 
around the world engaged in translating FSC-International’s evolving standard of 10 
Principles and 56 Criteria into national and regional standards in their respective 
jurisdictions.43   
 
That FSC is a global organisation is not especially controversial. A much more 
debatable claim is that its organisational structure is democratic. In an extensive 
review of FSC, Tollefson et al demonstrate how its various internal structures 
simulate the core structures of modern liberal democracies.44 Although democracy is a 
essentially contested concept, a simple popular definition is ‘government by the 
people and for the people’. Liberal democracies secure such government by adopting 
a number of basic principles of which four are key: a constitution, an enfranchised 
citizenry, elections, and the separation of powers. FSC’s institutions are comparable 
in some respects to each of these features of liberal democracy as the comparison 
below demonstrates. 
 
FSC was constituted by civil society for civil society. Participation at its founding 
meeting was broad and included individuals from environmental, social, economic 
and indigenous peoples groups from developed and developing countries. At its 
foundation meeting, existing FSC members voted in its constitution; and subsequent 
amendments to FSC’s basic documents are likewise subject to the equivalent of a 
                                                 
43 FSC, “National Initiatives”, January 2008, http://www.fsc.org/keepout/en/content_areas/33/1/ 
files/5_1_2_2008_01_22_FSC_National_Initiatives.pdf. FSC uses a somewhat complicated 
terminology that distinguishes several different types of ‘national initiative’. These can range from a 
simple contact person—an individual appointed by FSC International to act as a convenor of meetings 
and focal point for activity in a country—to full fledged national working groups that take 
responsibility for the development of national and regional standards, often with paid staff based in a 
national secretariat.  
44 Tollefson et al, Setting the Standard.  
referendum. The constitution obliges FSC to host regular meetings of its General 
Assembly at least every three years, with a 9-member Board similar to a 
governmental executive elected from the members to oversee the operation of the 
organisation between General Assembly meetings. 
 
In another parallel with liberal democracies, all members of FSC are entitled to attend 
and vote at FSC General Assembly, to participate in votes for the officers of the 
organisation, and to nominate themselves and others to stand for election. Elections 
are not, however, based on a ‘one-person, one-vote’ system because FSC permits both 
individual and corporate members to join, some of whom are extremely large 
companies such as Domtar and Mondi from the economic chamber and WWF and 
Greenpeace from the environmental chamber. Given its hybrid membership, a one-
person, one-vote arrangement could seriously compromise the organisation and lead 
to the equivalent of branch stacking at the level of individual electorates. Currently, 
therefore, individual members of the FSC are limited to constituting no more than 
10% of the total vote in any chamber. This constitutional principle would have to be 
revisited should FSC suddenly experience a vast influx of individual members. At 
present, however, this seems unlikely to happen.  
 
In addition to a set of parallel constitutional principles, membership and voting 
provisions, FSC also attempts to engage to some extent in a separation of powers via 
the establishment of a Dispute Resolution and Accreditation Appeals Committee 
(DRAAC). The purpose of the DRAAC is to hear complaints from members 
concerning any aspect of the FSC’s operation, including especially disputed 
certifications by certifying bodies. While the DRAAC system is only partially 
separated from key FSC institutions—ultimately the Secretariat, Board and General 
Assembly are viewed as having a role, its arrangements are nonetheless more robust 
than competitor schemes. 
 
In short, a good case can be made that FSC is accountable, transparent, balanced and 
open to the diverse interests that make up its ‘citizenry’. Members have several 
avenues through which they can make their views known to other members, to their 
chamber, to the Secretariat and to the General Assembly. While the FSC is far from 
an ‘ideal’ democratic system, the same can be said of many of the national democratic 
systems operating today. The fact that practices do not conform entirely to 
constitutional principles—witness branch stacking, mal-apportionment, 
gerrymandering, interference in judicial appointments, and vote buying—does not 
invalidate the general claim that democratic governments are, in the final analysis, 
accountable to the electorate for their actions.  
 
Of all the terms used to describe FSC, ‘corporatism’ requires the most explanation. In 
the West, corporatism is a pejorative term, taken as signalling how the interests of a 
small subset of privileged groups dominate those of the wider community. Thus, 
pluralists celebrate broad-based interest group competition within ‘polyarchies’ on the 
basis that no single group is sufficiently powerful to permanently secure its interests.45 
The problem with the pluralist image—as pluralists like Robert Dahl and Charles 
Lindblom came to appreciate—is that interest groups are not equal and some are able 
to dominate the policy agenda on an permanent basis. In Lindblom’s formulation, the 
market acts as a ‘prison’, forcing the state to consider the ‘privileged position of 
business’ in policy making.46 The problem with pluralist-style, stakeholder-based 
interest mediation processes—such as those used to develop national standards in 
many countries—is that they grant rule-making power to dominant social forces at the 
expense of other interests. They are often narrowly majoritarian in nature and as such 
cannot reflect a broad-based consensus on what is required in a specific set of 
circumstances. FSC’s solution to the imbalance evident in much national and 
international standard making is to create six equally weighted sub-chambers based 
on dominant interests and global location. Solutions emerge from a ‘double 
deliberation’: those that occur within subchambers and those that occur across sub-
chambers.  
 
FSC’s corporatist interest mediation arrangements promote a high level of intra- and 
inter-group deliberation. In practice, chamber-based coalitions must first deliberate on 
their group’s ‘bottom-line’ and then seek to build inter-group alliances so that the 
final decision reflects their preferences. In this corporatist interest intermediation 
arrangement, no single interest can dominate. The danger with the FSC process, of 
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course, is that deadlock can result. Majoritarian decision rules break this deadlock but 
at a heavy cost. Given the over-weaning dominance of ‘developmentalist’ interests 
within modern capitalist polities, majoritarianism is a system that marginalises 
environmental, social and indigenous peoples interests. Evidence is accumulating too 
that majoritarianism is resulting in seriously sub-optimal outcomes for capitalism 
itself. FSC provides an alternative, corporatist interest intermediation system that, so 
far, has resisted deadlock and generated high-quality policy outcomes both on paper 
and on the ground.   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that FSC is constituting a new global forest polity that 
competes with states for rule making authority in the forestry issue area. This is a 
controversial claim but it opens up enormous potential for thinking constructively 
about possibilities for future global governance. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648, analysts have been fascinated by the operation of the international system of 
states. But the problems of religious freedom and primitive territorial war that 
Westphalia was established to solve pale in comparison to those we need to solve 
today. Hence, it is imperative that states begin to share rule making authority with 
sectoral policies that are specifically built around the objectives of economic viability, 
ecological sustainability and social equity. FSC offers a practical model whereby 
those who care about a particular sectoral area—in this case forestry—can involve 
themselves in the rule making arrangements to determine what practices are necessary 
to achieve “environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable” 
forest management.  
 
FSC’s is an open-ended polity. It is not enclosed in a territory and it does not presume 
a demos in the normal sense of that term—i.e., a group tied by bonds of blood, 
language, culture and/or religion. Rather, what binds this emerging global forest 
polity together is a passionate commitment to economically efficient, ecological 
sustainable and socially just forest management. This does not mean that individuals 
abandon their nationality and cease to be Australians, Canadians, Americans, or 
Brazilians. Rather, what it involves is a rethinking of the tasks of the state in a 
globalising world. From Westphalia forward, the state became a totalising entity—
responsible for policy making in a huge range of sectors, reaching its apotheosis in the 
post-war welfare state based on Keynesian counter-cyclical demand-management 
policies. Since 1985, the state has been in a partial retreat—but only with regard to a 
limited range of mainly economic functions. Thus, it has ceded power of interest rates 
to independent central banks, and has bound itself to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers through the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.  
 
Curiously, however, the state has yet to let go of rule making authority in many other 
areas that are also rapidly becoming globalized. One such area is standard making 
which is still perceived to be an important national activity tied to competitive 
advantage and free trade. Yet, state’s could save themselves substantial amounts of 
money if they devolved rule-making authority to global agencies such as the FSC. A 
huge volume of current activity occurring in countries like Australia, Canada and the 
United States involves developing forest regulations, monitoring their implementation, 
enforcing codes of practices, hearing appeals, and so forth. At the stroke of a pen, the 
vast number of government officials that benefit from this bureaucratic approach to 
forest management could be dispensed with. Instead, the state could offer substantial 
incentives to forest companies to become FSC certified—and then leave the system 
for recertification in its hands. Of course, the possibilities do not end with forestry. In 
fact, there are a huge number of areas where sectoral polities could be established at 
the global level. Fisheries, mining, tourism, coffee, sugar, cotton, tea… the list of 
products appears almost endless. Luckily, one does not have to wait for states to take 
the lead either, a fact that explains why there are already several initiatives in the 
offing in these and other sectors. Sadly, however, to date none of these new initiatives 
appears to replicate the FSC structure. Perhaps that is because there is something 
unique with the forest sector? Or perhaps it reflects a failure to recognise exactly what 
FSC is and what it has been doing this past 15 years.  
